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Abstract: - This paper presents a failure propagation model for transport networks which are affected by 
epidemic failures. The network is controlled using the GMPLS protocol suite. The Susceptible Infected 
Disabled (SID) epidemic model is investigated and new signaling functionality of GMPLS to support epidemic 
failure resolution is proposed. The results provide important input to service recovery mechanisms under 
epidemic failures. 
 
Key-Words: resilience, transport networks, epidemic failures, network modelling, GMPLS, performance 
evaluation 
 
1 Introduction 
Nowadays, transport networks carry extremely large 
amounts of network traffic, and are widely spread 
across multiple geographical locations. As a result, 
any possible connectivity failure could directly 
impact the service delivery of a vast amount of 
users. Therefore, the network should be able to 
recover fast from a failure in order to provide 
service continuity to the user. Several recovery 
techniques have been employed by the Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) such as adding redundancy 
to network equipment (e.g. routers, optical cross-
connects, etc.), or by provisioning alternate paths 
(path protection, path restoration) X[1] and recovery 
mechanisms have amongst others been treated in the 
following works [2]-[6]. Hence, assuming sufficient 
resources, network resilience can be achieved when 
a single failure occur (e.g. fiber cut). However, 
when it comes to simultaneous failures such as 
cascading and epidemic failures, the available 
solutions are expensive [7]X. For Generalized Multi 
Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS) transport 
networks, network survivability under multiple 
failures has been discussed in [8]-[10]X. Virus 
propagation models from the field of epidemiology 
have been altered for simulating network failure 
scenarios and the failure propagation probability 
within the network [4],[5],[11]X,[12]. 
This paper evaluates the reliability of a GMPLS 
transport network under epidemic failure scenarios. 
Thus, the aim is to increase the fault tolerance of the 
GMPLS technology when simultaneous failures 
occur, impacting a large number of network nodes 
across an optical transport network (OTN) in order 
to ensure the service delivery. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 describes the GMPLS framework. Section 
3 deals with epidemic failures. Section 4 presents 
details about the SID implementation. The 
simulation study and its results are presented in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2 GMPLS Architecture 
GMPLS is an enhanced version of the MultiProtocol 
Label Switching (MPLS) architecture. MPLS uses 
labelled packets instead of using IP addressing for 
its forwarding decisions. In this way high switching 
performance is achieved, and at the same time 
requirements for traffic engineering are satisfied. 
The path from source to destination is called Label 
Switched Path (LSP). The network nodes, which 
support labelled paths, are called Label Switch 
Routers (LSR). MPLS LSRs have been designed to 
support only packet switching. GMPLS is extending 
the concept of label switching in order to enable it to 
work with optical networks [13]X. Thus, switching 
technologies such as Time Division Multiplex 
(TDM), Lambda Switch Capable (LSC) and Fibre 
Switch Capable (FSC) are supported by GMPLS. 
The support of those additional switching types in 
the optical domain has driven the extension of the 
GMPLS control plane, which is now logically 
and/or physically separated from the data plane. 
TDM, LSC and FSC introduce new constraints to IP 
addressing and to the routing models due to the fact 
that several hundreds of parallel physical links (e.g. 
wavelengths) are possible to exist between two 
interconnected nodes [14]]X. This separation of the 
control plane and the data plane introduces extra 
constraints, as additional control plane signalling 
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techniques are required for managing the data plane 
failures. On the other hand failures on the control 
plane are not necessarily a result of data traffic 
connection failures. GMPLS details are discussed in 
the following sub-sections. 
 
2.1 GMPLS Routing 
GMPLS networks typically use extended versions of 
the Open Shortest Path First-Traffic Engineering 
(OSPF-TE) algorithm for their routing decisions.  
Usually rerouting is required when a failure occurs 
along the already established LSP. Under certain 
conditions it might also be necessary for a LSP to 
return back to its original tunnels, if the failed 
resource becomes re/activated (reversion) [18]X. 
 
2.2 GMPLS Signalling 
In order to set up and tear down LSPs, GMPLS is 
making use of the Resource Reservation Protocol 
(RSVP) extensions. RSVP was initially designed to 
support Integrated Services (IntServ) in IP networks 
for reserving resources on the router in order to 
satisfy receiver initiated requests for Quality of 
Service (QoS). Therefore, when a sender wants to 
set up a connection, it is advertising its status by 
transmitting a Path message. This Path message 
traverses the network on a hop by hop basis in the 
downstream direction to one or more receivers as 
shown in Figure 1. The Path messages traverse the 
network towards the destination via intermediate 
RSVP-capable routers. Once a path message reaches 
its destination, the recipient node sends a 
Reservation (Resv) message. While the Resv 
message traverses the reversed path in the upstream 
direction to the sender, it is causing each 
intermediate node to reserve the traffic 
characteristics advertised in the Resv message.  
 
 
Figure 1: RSVP operation 
 
The development of MPLS required that RSVP 
should be extended to allow the support for Traffic 
Engineering (TE) by requesting and distributing 
label bindings [15]X. This resulted to a modified 
version of RSVP, known as Resource Reservation 
Protocol-Traffic Engineering (RSVP-TE). RSVP-
TE messages must include the following extra 
information: 
 A Label Request object: It is included in the 
Path message and informs the downstream 
LSR that it requests a label. In the path 
message an Explicitly Route Object (ERO) 
can be included. The ERO objects consist of 
the route of the nodes until the final 
destination. 
 A Session Attribute object: Indicates the 
priority of the requested LSP. The 
downstream node will compare this 
attribute with the holding priorities of the 
already established LSPs in order to decide 
if a new LSP should be established. The 
session attribute is included in Path 
messages. 
 A Label object: It is included in Resv 
messages and informs the upstream LSR 
which label should be used as unique 
identifier for the forwarding decisions. 
 
The LSP tunnel is established in the same fashion as 
previously described and data can flow via this path. 
In order to avoid adding extra load to an already 
congested path, each node in the LSP tunnel is using 
the above information also in refresh messages; 
even if there has been no change in the tunnel’s 
state. In case an intermediate node does not support 
Label requests or has no resources available it sends 
a Path Error (PathErr) message back to source node. 
By the end of the data transmission, if the receiver, 
or the sender has no more data to send, they can 
delete the created state by respectively using a 
message for releasing the allocated resources 
(ResvTear) and a message for tearing down the path 
(PathTear). Support for Hello messages has been 
defined in RSVP-TE extensions for node failure 
detection between neighbour nodes X[15]. 
 
2.3 Link Management 
The Link Management Protocol (LMP) is a point to 
point protocol which was defined in X[12]X It provides 
a mechanism for creating and managing multiple 
control channels between adjacent GMPLS nodes. It 
supports neighbour discovery fault management, 
thus takes part in the protection and restoration 
mechanisms of GMPLS optical networks. Some of 
the most important functions are: 
 Control Channel Management: LMP 
neighbour nodes exchange messages for 
establishing a control channel connection. 
Once the control channel is active, 
maintenance of the channel is achieved by 
the regular exchange of Hello messages. 
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 Link Discovery and Verification: Is a 
procedure for checking the status and 
connectivity of the data links between two 
LMP peers. This may be carried out on a 
timer just to check that everything is 
functioning correctly, or it may require 
specific operator intervention due to a 
possible failure. 
 Link Capabilities Exchange: It is an 
optional phase, which can take place after 
Link Discovery. So that the LSRs can tell 
each other about the specific features of the 
data link that is useful to build TE links out 
of multiple parallel physical links through 
the process bundling. 
 Fault Isolation: One of the most important 
features of LMP. Devices such as photonic 
crossconnects may normally not notice, if 
there is a disruption to the signal, and LMP 
helps to isolate and report faults, that may 
occur. The process is initiated by a 
downstream node that detects a problem on 
a data link. A failure can be detected due to 
Loss of Light (LoL) or due signal 
degradation. 
 
 
3. GMPLS Survivability under 
Epidemic Failures 
Network survivability is defined as the set of 
capabilities that allow a network to recover from 
failures in a timely manner [19],[20] X In GMPLS 
transport networks the failures can be split into two 
groups: 
1. Control plane failures: for example a 
controller misconfiguration or a channel 
failure could result in making new service 
delivery requests impossible and existing 
services unmanageable. 
2. Data plane failures: directly impact the 
service delivery and could be caused by a 
failure of an element across the transmission 
line i.e. a fiber cut or a power outage. 
 
3.1 General Failure Mechanisms 
In general terms failures could occur as a 
consequence of software or hardware defects, power 
outages or natural disasters such as earthquakes, 
floats, etc. Since the early start of the transport 
networks, service recovery processes have been 
defined under the term fault management as a key 
factor for improving the service availability and 
reliability. In GMPLS, fault management is taking 
place in the following 3 steps: 
1. Fault detection 
2. Fault localization and isolation 
3. Fault notification and recovery  
 
Depending of the recovery type defined by a Service 
Level Agreement (SLA) with the service provider, 
there are certain actions to be performed in order to 
switch over the traffic to alternate paths for 
recovering the service. The time it takes for 
switching the traffic to a working path is the 
recovery time T, which is calculated as follows: 
 
(1) 
                                            
where 
Tf is the fault detection time, 
Tl is the fault isolation time, 
Tr is the fault recovery time. 
 
In case there are not any service recovery guarantees 
(unprotected service), then no actions are 
performed.  
In GMPLS networks service recovery can be 
achieved by the so called protection and restoration 
mechanisms. The former defines a service recovery 
class where support for one or more alternate routes 
is required. An alternate route assumes that at least 
one redundant path has been provisioned and 
resources have been allocated pro-actively; before a 
failure is detected. The restoration mechanism is 
taking place after a failure occurrence, when for the 
recovery of the service a new path needs to be 
calculated, or has already been calculated. Thus, 
after a failure notification is received it is decided, if 
resources should be dynamically allocated for 
serving this new path. 
 
3.2 Epidemic Failures 
Epidemic failure propagation has its roots in 
medical virology and relates to models on how 
diseases are spread [16]XX. The Susceptible Infected 
Disabled (SID) model was proposed as an extension 
to the SIS model in order to model the behaviour of 
an epidemic in GMPLS transport networks [22] X. 
The SID model was proposed for dealing with 
failures, which tend to propagate over the network. 
The states listed below represent the possible 
GMPLS node states according to the SID model: 
1. Susceptible (S): State where both the 
control plane and the data plane are 
operational. 
2. Infected (I): State where the control plane 
fails, but the already established LSPs 
continue to function, i.e., data forwarding is 
not impaired. After a given period the node 
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either recovers (going to S state) or 
completely fails (going to D state). 
3. Disabled (D): Both control plane and data 
plain fail representing a complete nodal 
failure. Thus any provided service stops. 
 
A susceptible node can be infected with probability 
β. When a node is at the infected state the 
restoration process starts and lasts a given amount of 
time, which is proportional to the Mean Time To 
Repair (MTTR). After this time has expired, the 
node becomes susceptible with probability δ1 or 
disabled with probability τ. In case the node 
becomes disabled another restoration process will 
take place, which has a success probability of δ2. If 
the restoration process is successful the node will 
transit to the susceptible state; otherwise, in case of 
a failure the node will remain disabled [22] X. The 
possible transitions according to the relevant 
probabilities are depicted on XFigure 2X. 
 
 
Figure 2: SID Model X[17] 
 
The average number of infections produced by an 
infected node, called basic reproduction number 
R0, is calculated using the following formula [10] X: 
 
(2)
where λ1 > 0 is average nodal degree when a 
homogeneous network is considered. In case the 
network is not homogeneous, it has been proven that 
the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency topology 
matrix (spectral radius) is a more suitable property 
for epidemic modelling [21] X If R0 < 1, then the 
infection dies out over time. On the contrary, if R0 > 
1 the epidemic sustains while impacting a large 
number of nodes within the network. In this case the 
proportion of susceptible (S) nodes is 
 
(3)
and the proportion of infected (I) and disabled (D) 
nodes is given by equations (4) and (5) respectively: 
(4)
 
where 
 
and 
 
(5)
 
3.3 Application to GMPLS Control and Data 
Plane Failures 
Failure detection is a vital part of the service 
recovery. Once a failure is detected it needs to be 
reported to the relevant nodes that formulate the 
LSP. In the current work, two control plane failure 
detection methods are examined: 
1. By using a Path timer message for 
refreshing the LSP state. 
2. With the use of a Hello protocol. 
 
When it comes to data plane failures, those can be 
detected almost instantly by the LoL (Loss of Light 
on the line) or by monitoring the Bit Error Rate.  
In the following subsections the implemented 
signaling operations are described for the control 
and data plane separately.  
 
3.2.1 Control plane failure during the 
downstream LSP establishment 
During the operation to the downstream direction 
there are two possible failure scenarios that need to 
be handled depending on which mechanism detects 
the failure and on which plane is impacted. Two 
mechanisms have been implemented for detecting a 
control plane failure: 
 
Via a Path timer: By using a timer after a Path 
message is sent. As shown on Figure 3 the 
downstream node B has received a Path message 
from his upstream node A and has available 
resources to allocate. Thus, it forwards a Path 
message at time T1 to its downstream node C and 
starts a timer. This timer is defining the period in 
which a node waits to receive a Resv message. 
When the node receives a Resv message it can 
allocate resources for serving the connection. This 
period is equal to the round trip time (RTT) starting 
from the moment that a Path message is send until a 
Rerv message is received plus the processing delay 
of each node along the path [19]. Consequently, if 
node B has not received a Resv within a certain time 
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period it blocks the connection request and sends a 
Path error message to its upstream node A which in 
return terminates the connection request, as it is the 
initiator of the LSP request.  
 
Figure 3: Control plane failure detection via the Path 
timer at the downstream direction 
 
Via the Hello protocol:  
As mentioned before, a node does a look up on its 
routing table and sends Hello messages to its 
directly connected neighbors in order to check if 
they are available. On Figure 4, node B sends a 
Hello packet to the infected node C at T1 and starts 
the retransmission timer. 
When the timer expires (after 30 sec) it sends  
another Hello message. If node B does not receive a 
Hello Ack it will retransmit again the Hello. After 3 
unsuccessful attempts node B will realize that node 
C is not responding and will report to its upstream 
node with a Path Err message (for every ongoing 
LSP establishment process). Additionally, Node B 
updates its routing table by excluding node C as 
downstream destination. Thus, incoming Path 
requests that include node C in the ERO message 
will be blocked. 
 
Figure 4: Control plane failure detection via the Hello 
protocol 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Control plane failure during the upstream 
LSP establishment 
In this case a node becomes infected during the LSP 
establishment in the upstream direction as depicted 
on Figure 5. Node D has allocated resources for 
serving the connection request for both directions 
and sends a Resv message to its upstream node C at 
time T4. Node C will fail to receive the Resv 
message because its control plane is not operating. 
Hence, node 
D will realize this failure at a certain time T5 via the 
Hello protocol, after 3 unsuccessful attempts for 
receiving Hello Ack. Until the time when this 
failure is realized nodes D and E have allocated 
resources for serving the LSP. Therefore, Node D 
will release its resources for serving this path and 
send a Path tear message to the downlink direction. 
A Path tear messag will be forwarded from the node 
that detected the failure to the downstream direction. 
 
 
Figure 5: Failure occurrence during upstream LSP 
establishment 
 
 
3.2.3 Data plane failures 
As previously mentioned the data plane failures can 
be detected almost instantly by the LoL or by 
monitoring the Bit Error Rat (BER). In a real 
network system, this would be detected by the 
physical equipment. In the model however, this 
failure detection is mimicked by letting the failed 
node sends a Failed message to its neighbors. 
Therefore the neighbor nodes upon receiving the 
Failed message are informed about the failure and 
examine if there is an active LSP that uses the failed 
node. If there is an active LSP traversing this node 
then it should be identified whether it is located at 
downstream or upstream direction. 
According to where the failure is located along the 
path the relevant signaling operations are taking 
place informing the nodes along the path regarding 
the broken path. 
 
Data plane failures can happen at any point. Thus, 
the cases where a data-plane failure of a node on the 
path happens have to be covered. The following 
cases are examined: 
 
1. During the path establishment to the downstream 
direction. If the failed node is downstream node 
direction a Path err message the detecting node is 
reporting to upstream direction among the path 
Figure 8 A. The failed node C is a downstream node 
to B. In the case B is sending Path Error to the path 
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initiator node A. On the other side of the path node 
D detects that there is a failure of its upstream node 
C. Hence the failure is reported by sending a Notify 
message the next hop in the downstream direction. 
In this way all nodes along the path will be notified 
for the broken path. 
 
2. During the path establishment to the upstream 
direction. In this scenario Figure 8 B the failure 
occurs while resources have been allocated for 
servicing the path. If the failed node is located at the 
downstream direction then a Notify message is send 
to the upstream direction until it reaches the initiator 
node that will drop the connection. In the 
downstream direction of the broken LSP all the 
nodes have reserved resources for servicing the 
path. Therefore the reporting node D reporting the 
failure by sending a Path tear message to 
downstream direction. 
 
3. While the LSP is established. This case is handled 
in the same way to the as in case 2. 
 
 
Figure 6: Data plane failure during LSP 
establishment 
 
 
3. SID Algorithmic Implementation 
For initializing the SID model a node is selected 
randomly from the network topology map and is 
set as infected. This node is the starting point for 
spreading the infection to its neighbor nodes. 
Thus, in case the selected node has a high nodal 
degree it is expected to see wider spread of the 
infection, as seen in [10]. 
Whenever a node is entering the infection state the 
SID algorithm is executed in order to determine the 
time period a node will remain infected until it 
transits to the next state. The SID algorithm has 
been implemented in a procedure called 
meaninfectionperiod() as follows: 
 
 
Figure 7: Algorithmic implementation 
 
During the period of time a node is infected and the 
control plane is failed, the node is stopping the 
transmission of any signalling messages. 
Consequently, when a node is entering the Infected 
state it performs the following actions: 
 Stop responding to any signalling messages 
by dropping all incoming messages. 
 Stop generating new connection requests 
and also stop any control plane signaling. 
 Keep the already established connections 
active. 
 Transmit the infection to its neighbours. 
 
As previously described during the description of 
the meaninfectionperiod() procedure, when the 
infection recovery timer expires the node could 
possibility: 
 Return back to the Susceptible state with a 
certain probability δ1 or, 
 Transit to the Disabled state with τ 
probability. 
 
In case none of the above actions occur, then the 
node remains infected until the infection recovery 
timer expires. Then, meaninfectionperiod() 
procedure will be executed again creating a loop as 
long as the result is to remain infected. Hence, there 
is no guarantee that a node ever exits the infected 
state. 
For the case the procedure results that the next state 
will be Susceptible the control plane returns back to 
operation. Additionally, new connection requests 
can be initiated by re-enabling the ReqGen. 
Finally, in the case that the procedure results that the 
node will transit to the Disabled state the disabled 
recovery timer is activated. In real life this timer 
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corresponds to the time period when troubleshooting 
actions are taking place for repairing a node failure. 
During the reparation period the Disabled node is 
irresponsible and both control and data plane are 
failing. Thus, when the node is entering the 
Disabled state implements the following actions: 
 Release the resources which have been 
allocated for serving any active LSPs' 
(connections). 
 Stop transmitting the infection. 
 Drop all incoming signalling messages. 
 Stop generating new connection requests 
and start signalling. 
 
When the disabled recovery timer expires it should 
be decided whether the node will either become 
Susceptible again (probability δ2), or if it will 
remain at its current Disabled state. In case the node 
remains Disabled the actions below are taking place: 
 Restart the disabled recovery timer. 
 Reproduce a random time and check 
whether it is greater than the value of the δ2 
probability. 
 
It is worth noticing that in both cases when a node is 
Infected or Disabled there is no guarantee that the 
node will return to Susceptible state after the 
recovery timer expires. This is one of the main 
differentiators of the SID model in comparison to 
previous network epidemic models. 
Finally, the time period that a node remains as 
Infected Ti and Disabled Td is given by the 
following formulas: 
 
 
     (6)
 
     (7)
 
 
Where MTTRi is the Mean Time To Repair a 
control plane failure and MTTRd is the Mean Time 
To Repair a data plane failure. 
In general terms the MTTR is defined as the mean 
period of time needed to repair a failure or to 
recover a service. The MTTR can vary according to 
the offered SLAs' by the service providers. 
 
4 Simulation Study and Results 
The SID epidemic propagation model is evaluated 
using the OPNET Modeler [23] X simulation software, 
in both a homogeneous and a heterogeneous 
network topology.  
It is worth noticing that in both cases when a node is 
Infected or Disabled there is no guarantee that the 
node will return to Susceptible state after the 
recovery timer expires. This is one of the main 
differentiators of the SID model in comparison to 
previous network epidemic models. 
  
4.1 Homogeneous network topology 
As a first step, the model is verified against 
analytical results for a homogeneous network 
networks given in [22]. The selected homogeneous 
network topology is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Homogeneous random mesh topology 
 
The network type is random mesh and consists of 20 
nodes. In order to verify the model the epidemic 
should persist, i.e. the basic reproduction number R0 
must be greater than 1. Hence, the epidemic is 
spreading over time impacting a large amount of 
nodes. 
Due to the fact that the average nodal degree (λ) is 
highly impacting the infection propagation it has 
been chosen as simulation parameter for comparing 
the simulation results against the analytical values. 
Therefore, the infection and the recovery 
probabilities have been kept as constant parameters 
with the following values: β = 0.169, τ = 0.1, δ1 = 
0.3, δ2= 0.3. The values of the average node degree 
are the result of adding more links between the 
network nodes. The expected fraction of 
Susceptible, Infected and Disabled nodes has been 
calculated by using the formulas (2)-(5). The 
simulated results have been derived by 140 
simulation experiments simulating a 2 week period. 
Both infection recovery and the disable recovery 
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period have been set t 2 minutes. Those values are 
intentionally kept low due to the fact that longer 
recovery times will result in a pandemic when a 
homogeneous network is considered. The results 
correspond to the percentage of nodes over time for 
each state. 
Both analytical and simulation results are displayed 
on. As can be seen on Figure 9, adding more links 
to the network increases the probability that an 
infected node will successfully transmit the 
infection to one of its neighbours. As a consequence 
the number of susceptible nodes declines while the 
value of λ increases. The analytical results have 
been calculated using the formulas for homogeneous 
networks given in [22]. 
 
 
Figure 9 : Comparison of analytical values and 
simulation results 
 
Next, the performance of the two notification 
methods, the Hello Protocol method and the Path 
timer method, is evaluated and the results for 
average link usage, dropped new connection 
requests and the number of susceptible nodes are 
shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, respectively. 
 
The simulation period is 30 days. The epidemic is 
initialised on day 15. The number of dropped new 
connections linearly increases for both 
implementations. As can be seen the Hello protocol 
method results in fewer dropped new connection 
requests (please notice the difference in the y-axis).  
 
 
Figure 10: Evaluation of Hello protocol method  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Evaluation of Path timer method 
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4.2 Heterogeneous network topology 
The evaluated heterogeneous network topology is 
the Pan-European optical network shown in XFigure 
12X. 
 
 
Figure 12: Pan European Network Topology 
 
The network consists of 28 nodes and 78 links 
interconnecting major cities located in Europe with 
average nodal degree λ = 2.7. The eigenvalues of the 
adjacency matrix have been calculated and the 
largest value is equal to 3.232. The time periods of 
the recovery timers are related to a complete node 
failure, where it might take one full working day (8 
hours) for repair. The MTTRi and MTTRd 
correspond to the different recovery times for the 
infection and the disabled state respectively. The 
value of R0 is adjusted by increasing the value of 
the infection probability β. Thus, starting from R0 < 
1 (the epidemic dies over time) the basic 
reproduction number increments by increasing the 
infection probability as shown in Table 1 XX. 
  
 Analytical Values 
β 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
R0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.0 4.8 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.1 
S 100% 62% 41% 31% 25% 21% 18% 15% 14% 12% 
I 0% 29% 44% 52% 56% 60% 62% 63% 65% 66% 
D 0% 10% 15% 17% 19% 20% 21% 21% 22% 22% 
Table 1: Analytical values as function of beta β 
 
 
The percentage of the nodes for each state is 
presented as function of the basic reproduction 
number (R0). The recovery probabilities have been 
kept as constant parameters with the following 
values: τ = 0.1, δ1 = 0.3, δ2= 0.3. The results are 
presented against the analytical values for each state 
with a 95% confidence interval over 100 simulation 
experiments simulating one month timer period. The 
selected MTTRi and MTTRd are 2 and 8 hour 
respectively. Figures 12-14 illustrate the percentage 
of nodes in states S, I and D respectively, compared 
against their analytical values. Please not that the 
same formulas for the analytical values were used, 
but as the work in [22] considers homogeneous 
networks some deviation is expected between the 
simulated and the analytical values. 
 
 
Figure 13: Percentage of nodes in S state as a function 
of R0  
 
In Figure 13 it is observed that the simulation 
results for S state present a minor deviation 
compared to the analytical values however they 
follow the analytical curve.  
 
By looking at XFigure 14 and Figure 15 where state 
I and D are shown, the simulation results 
considerably deviate from the analytical ones. The 
deviation becomes wider for higher values of R0. 
The reason for this deviation is related to the 
characteristic of the network. The average nodal 
degree, the connectivity density, the network 
diameter and size etc. affect the simulation results, 
including the heterogeneity of the network topology.  
 
 
Figure 14: Percentage of nodes in I state as function of 
R0 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Percentage of nodes in D state as function 
of R0 
 
X 
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A node that becomes disabled could possibly remain 
in Disabled state during the simulation period. 
Another important factor is the fraction of time 
where a node remains infected.  
 
 
Figure 16: Analytical values against the simulation 
result for the I state for different MTTRi 
 
Figure 16X illustrates that the chosen MTTRi has a 
significant impact on the average percentage of 
infected nodes in the simulation. By using only the 
MTTRi as a single simulation parameter the 
experiment took place for 4 different MTTRi while 
the MTTRd was kept to 8 hours. At an MTTRi of 4 
hours the average percentage of infected nodes 
resulted in 42% with an 95%-confidence interval 
between [39;45]. Thus the analytical value of 44% 
lies in the confidence interval given an MTTRi of 4 
hours.  
 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, the dynamics of epidemic failure 
spreading in a Pan-European heterogeneous network 
is analyzed. The GMPLS framework is extended to 
accommodate epidemic failure messages and model 
the SID epidemic model in OPNET. The results 
show that the dynamic simulation follows the 
analytical values for the S and I states, whereas 
some deviation in the D state due to the topological 
characteristics of the network topology is observed.  
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